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Listening to the Evidence: Service Activity and
Understanding Social Phenomena
by Hugh Lacey
The university, as an institution, plays many roles in contemporary society.
In recent years, it has also become increasingly fragmented to the extent
that now there is difficulty in discerning any common purpose and shared
core values, or even common language for critical discussion of them,
among members of the university. With the fragmentation - accompanied
by the widespread adoption of epistemic and moral relativism or skepticism,
and the language of "valid educational experience" coming to ascendancy
over the traditional language of "truth" - it is difficult to find a ground to
argue rationally about the place (if any) of service-learning in the curriculum. Consequently, argument on this matter has tended to become replaced
by pragmatic compromises that have provided little insight into important
educational values. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that "servicelearning" has become a general label for a diverse range of activities with
various degrees of educational value whose only common element is that
they involve some sort of integration of service into academic credit-gaining
activities. I do not think that it is fruitful to attempt to discuss the value of
service-learning in general terms.
I have a very limited objective in this paper: to argue that certain practices of service, accompanied by carefully structured reflections to which a
variety of theoretical frameworks are brought to bear, may be able to play an
important (and, under current historical conditions, perhaps an essential)
role in coming to understand some social phenomena currently of great significance. My focus will be on the phenomenon of urban poverty in the
United States, including the repercussions of the recently enacted welfare
reforms. The role that I have in mind is played out neither by treating the
practices of service simply as a means to gaining understanding, nor by subordinating the gaining of understanding to service, or to those moral virtues
that may be cultivated within the practices of service. Instead, the role is
played out in the course of a complex dialectic of service and understanding, that keeps in awareness that the service activities themselves become
part of the phenomena that are to be understood and that, in principle, they
make a difference to assessments of what possibilities the phenomena
allow. Despite the fragmentation referred to above, I assume - though my
assumption will be contested - that one of the core tasks of the university
remains to gain understanding of the significant social phenomena of the
times, those phenomena from which no lives are isolated and response to
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which largely defines the moral character of an age. 1
At the present moment, following the enactment of welfare reform legislation, the conditions of the lives of the poor in the United States are
undergoing rapid change. Interestingly, much of the debate surrounding the
legislation has rested upon a mode of understanding of urban poverty, with
respect to which there appears to be broad agreement: (in impressionistic
summary) that the current condition of the poor represents a state of dependency on government, which has reinforced numerous vices (laziness;
avoidance of work; violence, criminality, and other forms of social destructiveness; irresponsible sexual, child-bearing, and child-raising habits; drug
use; absence of personal initiative and lack of preparedness to make use of
opportunities; manipulativeness in blaming their condition on racism and
playing on feelings of guilt among the well off) that entrap the poor in a "culture of poverty"; that, on balance, recent government programs on behalf of
the poor represent a net harm (perhaps, in some versions, because they
could not be efficacious, since the causes of poverty are not social or structural but rather located in individual attributes such as low "intelligence"
and alleged genetic proneness to violence); that government spending for
programs targeted to alleviate poverty represents a burden on, or even an
injustice toward, the middle-class taxpayer; and hence that possibilities for
empowerment of the poor require putting in place conditions that will impel
them toward "self-sufficiency" and "taking responsibility for their lives."
Several features of the debate on welfare reform have struck me as
worth noting. In the first place, the participants in it tend to display remarkable certitude about their diagnoses and their prescriptions, though few
have had close contact with any poor people or ongoing dialogical relations
with them, and though the "evidence" offered to support their diagnoses is
hotly contested and, at best, partial and riddled with ambiguities. In a work
originally published almost a century ago (1903), Du Bois wrote, "We must
not forget that most Americans answer all queries regarding the Negro a priori, and that the least that human courtesy can do is to listen to the evidence" (Du Bois 1982: 130). It seems that his remark still holds, and applies
as well more generally to the poor.
Second, the voices of the poor themselves are largely absent. Little effort
has been expended to find out how poor people characterize themselves,
how they diagnose the causes of their condition, how they express their
hopes, and how they identify and articulate the possibilities that they consider worthy of their aspiration. They - "the evidence" - are not being
much listened to. They tend not to be seen as parties to developing the "solution" to the "problem" that they, their behavior, their traits, and their communities are perceived to constitute.

54

PHILOSOPHY

Third, the language of the debate is often harsh, punitive, scornful,
humiliating, coercive, "tough," and disengaged, dominated by appeal to "realism" - a realism (framed at the moment by such certitudes as the value of
the free market, private control of capital, down-scaled government, and
extended realms for private initiatives, and the "naturalness" of prioritizing
self-interest) that does not recognize any viable possibilities outside the
framework of its core certainties. It is a realism, I might add, more responsive to the realities of power than to the fruits of careful, systematic, empirical inquiry. Absent from this language is any sense of mercy, love (except
"tough love"), compassion, solidarity, brother- and sisterhood, sacrifice for
the sake of the common good, and any sense that our lives are intertwined.
No doubt they are absent because they do not figure in the equations and
calculations of "realism." Could it be that there is a connection between the
certitude of diagnosis and the harshness oflanguage, so that the "a priori" is
grounded in the preparedness to use power (and the institutions of violence,
e.g., prisons) to ensure compliance with the tenets of "realism"? Or perhaps
it is grounded in the widespread tendency to replace the full exploration of
the causal nexus of poverty with the premature (and morally righteous)
assignment of responsibilities for the failure to eliminate its pathologies.
These are, of course, just impressions and polemical comments on the
debate about welfare reform. I state them here to provide a context for raising the question about what it is to gain understanding of a social phenomenon such as urban poverty in the United States. What would we find out if
we "listened to the evidence"? How must we be placed and what must we do
in order to listen to it? With what language must we transcribe the evidence,
and how do we learn that language? What possibilities (if any) for the future,
and what varieties of them, are there in the communities of poor people to
be identified that are not recognized in mainstream discourse? These questions generally are not considered at length in the mainstream because, I
think, it is widely taken for granted (another "a priori"?): (1) that there are no
significant possibilities for the foreseeable future outside the structures
framed predominantly by the free market, private control of capital, and private enterprise, and, consequently, that individualist values will continue to
be celebrated, manifested, and embodied in societal institutions ever more
completely so that any attempt (for example) to cultivate values such as solidarity or to work toward creating significant cooperative institutions is flying in the face of reality; and (2) within these structures and their supporting institutions, there are continually expanding opportunities - eventually, in principle, open to everyone - for individuals to achieve their wants and
to satisfy their needs, provided that they take the appropriate individual initiatives (for detailed discussion of these assertions, see Lacey 1997).
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Understanding
Now I will turn directly to the questions: What is it to gain understanding of
a social phenomenon such as urban poverty in the United States today? How
is that understanding gained and how ought it be gained? What criteria of
evaluation should it meet?
I suggest that gaining understanding of such a phenomenon involves
three interacting components that describe, explain, and encapsulate the
possibilities allowed by the phenomenon (see Lacey 1991, 1993, 1995a).
Gaining understanding involves, first, a comprehensive descriptive charting
of the phenomenon and of the agents whose lives are part of it, which
includes accounts of its variations, differences, and conflicts, and is sensitive
to all of its dimensions, concreteness, historicity, and particularity as well as
to statistical generalizations, and to the sources for (i.e., realized anticipa
tions of and proposals for furthering) hope and transformation present with
in it as well as to the sufferings and pathologies that have brought it to
mainstream attention as a "problem."
It involves, second, a historical-sociological analysis of how the phe
nomenon has been shaped and maintained, together with an analysis of the
social and material conditions as well as the mechanisms and regularities of
the various modes of life that the structures that frame the phenomenon
allow (and require), and of the interactions and structural relations among
these modes of life. This provides the background for assessing and apprais
ing the relative importance of the various factors (natural, individual, behav
ioral, interpersonal, cultural, institutional, structural - and their interac
tions with one another) that might have made causal contributions to the
phenomenon, recognizing that explanatory adequacy requires that atten
tion be given to all the detail charted descriptively.
Third, gaining understanding involves attempts to diagnose what the
range of future possibilities may be, including those for fundamental trans
formation, given the conditions and constraints provided by the present
phenomena and their structural framing; and to identify what practices,
what alliances with other people and institutions, and what restructuring of
institutions and structures would be necessary to bring some of these pos
sibilities to realization. Crucial here is the recognition that on the one hand
the currently predominant structures, their regularities, and their tenden
cies significantly constrain the range of future possibilities, but that on the
other hand there are genuine possibilities, realized in anticipatory forms in
the marginal spaces of these structures, that may be able to gain the condi
tions to develop.
I think that certain kinds of service activities (which I will specify below)
can play useful roles in gaining understanding of phenomena such as those
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of urban poverty. In order to make the argument for this in its minimal form,
I will focus on the third component, the question of future possibilities
(though clearly it presupposes the descriptive charting component). I
emphasize that understanding cannot be reduced to description and explanation; it also involves encapsulation of future possibilities and, in tum, cannot be reduced to prediction that, in the social sciences, is achievable only
under stable structural conditions. I will address how the question of future
possibilities can be pursued in a disciplined and empirical way that avoids
simultaneously the pitfalls of ideology (accepting the inevitability of the
tendencies of the status quo as defined by actual relations of power) and
illusion (fueled by a value-driven voluntarism, deriving possibilities from
what one deems desirable). While sound understanding is opposed to both
ideology and illusion, it is not uninformed by values. From values one cannot derive what is possible, but values can attune us to realms of possibilities that are worthy of investigation. Moreover, in human affairs, certain possibilities can be realized only if there are people who hold certain values,
who desire that those possibilities be realized, and who are motivated to act
to bring them to realization.
Any human phenomenon can issue in myriad possibilities, since it
involves (among other things) the behavior of intentional agents and relations among them, and it is open to transformation in the light of reshaping
its relations and interactions with any number and variety of individuals and
social institutions. (Remember: Service activities of members of the university become part of the phenomenon of urban poverty.) Not all genuine possibilities can be realized, for the conditions required for the realization of some
may preclude what is required for others. Furthermore, since the investigation of social possibilities itself requires material and social conditions, not all
genuine social possibilities and the means toward their possible realization
can be investigated. We cannot expect to be able to develop theories in which
all genuine possibilities will be encapsulated. In order to investigate future
possibilities, a selection of the kinds of possibilities of interest must be made,
a selection that will reflect a value commitment, even if the selection made
is just to investigate the trajectory of actual structures and their predominant tendencies. When we tum to a phenomenon such as contemporary
urban poverty, however, understanding is seriously incomplete if it does not
identify possibilities (if there are any) for the lessening of the suffering (in all
of its dimensions) experienced by the poor and for the transformation of their
condition so that possibilities for human flourishing become more available
to them, and if it does not identify the social processes and the institutions
that might serve to bring these possibilities to realization, or if it does not
explain (with explanations that have been well tested empirically) why no
possibilities for transformation are available.'
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Thus, if we want to understand poverty, we need to address: (3) Do the
tendencies and regularities of current structures open up (or prevent) possibilities of expanding the well-being of the poor and the suffering (without
diminishing that of others)? (4) Do alternative social arrangements - aspired
to in movements for social change in poor communities and present in anticipatory forms among them - offer greater possibilities? Could modifications
of current structures, and transformations of its institutions, provide space
that would permit such possibilities to expand and come to realization?

Evidence
How can such questions be investigated in a way that is systematic and
empirically grounded - without being constrained by the "a priori" reflected in questions (1) and (2), or by presumptions tailored to fit our hopes and
desires, but recognizing both that future possibilities are constrained (not
determined) by prevailing structures, powers, and conceptions of well-being
(as well as by natural and ecological factors), and that what the future will
be depends largely on the agency and choices of human beings, interacting
together? 3 Answering this question in a comprehensive way is beyond the
scope of this article. I focus on an important detail. What should count as
evidence when addressing issues such as (3) and (4)?
Relevant evidence includes detailed accounts of the phenomenon as it
is experienced by members of poor communities themselves, accounts
therefore that are attentive not only to the sufferings and the pathologies of
the community, to the usual demographic and statistical analyses, and to
the micromechanisms underlying them. It must also include (since we wish
to investigate alternative possibilities that may be germinating in the communities) the concrete daily experience of members of the community, their
histories, struggles and achievements, values, knowledge, visions and
images of hope, motivations, practical ideas, leaders, alliances and affiliations, budding initiatives, frustrated previous efforts, programs for transformation, and interpretations of their condition, of ongoing events, of whom
(persons and institutions) they trust and distrust, and why. Such evidence
cannot be gained without contact - extended, multifaceted, and involving
considerable listening and dialogue - with those who experience the phenomenon of poverty.

Service
How can the appropriate contact be obtained? One way is through carefully
designed projects of service, and often it is the only way practically open to
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university personnel. Other ways would include living or working in a poor
community or participating in its religious life. Obviously the poor themselves have the contact simply by virtue of being poor. That is why reflective
testimony of the experience of the poor made by poor people themselves has
an authority that is not readily discounted; nor, of course, is it the last word
on an issue. Service, as such, is not sufficient, for it may be performed while
making very little contact with the experience and context of the lives of the
poor, and with little understanding of the conditions that must be in place
for service to be effective. Under certain conditions, it may even hinder gaining understanding of the possibilities of transformation. (That is one of the
reasons why a general defense of service-learning cannot be given.)
To be able to provide the appropriate contact, service activities normally should be part of a well-planned set of programs, where the activities and
programs display the following four interacting levels (Lacey 1995b; Lacey,
Bradley, and Eldridge 1994):
1. Each of the programs and activities has value by itself by virtue of its
attempting to address a need identified by community members in an urban
poor neighborhood - bringing resources, skills, training, and above all
knowledge and the capability to generate knowledge into the community
(see Note 9).
2. These programs and activities are integrated in a process of comprehensive community-wide (and, where possible, broader social) change building institutions that all participants will share - directed toward goals
established in collaboration with the community members.
3. They are carried out at a site (or sites) where students and others can
perform community service (whether motivated by voluntarism or activism,
charity or justice) that has been approved by the community and that is subject to ongoing supervision and evaluation, and where efforts are made to
foster discussion and interaction between community members and those
engaged in the service activities, to nurture respect and friendships, and to
explore together further forms of collaboration.
4. They are conducted with a spirit of reciprocity, with all involved conceiving what they are doing as part of a common task whose goals are
important for all of them. University personnel, community residents, and
representatives of other public, private, and community organizations conceive themselves as working together for the same goals while playing different roles. The university personnel are not helpers or providers, but
accompany and participate in the process of social change for the long haul,
aiming, among other things, to create a new kind of institution of learning
in which poor people can participate at all levels and from which they can
gain knowledge and research to inform their projects for social change.
The four levels interact. All are equally essential. Some are not for the
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sake of others; rather, each is for the sake of all the others. All are essential if
the service activity is to provide the kind of contact that locates one adequately for gaining evidence of the kind referred to above, while not treating
service to the poor simply as a means to ends held by various university personnel. Service alters the phenomenon. Ideally, it becomes part of the means
to bringing about social change of the kind desired by the community members and - at the same time - to bringing about transformations in the
structures of learning and research in the university. Where all the levels are
in place, programs of service become (in part) tests of certain types of possibilities of social transformation, e.g., the possibility of shaping social institutions (of which the university is an important instance) so as to exhibit the
widest possible inclusiveness, diversity of perspectives, visions, and people,
where there is special attention to including those currently excluded or
neglected. Then, assessment of their success and progress (or failure) is itself
a partial provider of relevant evidence about what future possibilities may be.
My point is a very simple one and, if one holds that one's claims to understand should be submitted to the tribunal of broadly empirical criteria, a
quite obvious one: Understanding the phenomenon of poverty requires experiential contact with it, and projects of service - structured in the way outlined - can provide the opportunity for having that contact. The contact, of
course, does not provide the understanding but the occasion for gaining the
evidence to bring to bear in gaining understanding. Thus, projects of service
of these kinds, provided that they are accompanied by careful and systematic reflection, and the further study, analysis, and research necessary for the
formation and testing of an emerging understanding of poverty, play useful
roles in connection with one of the fundamental tasks of the university.

Service and a Course in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
While my point is simple, the conditions that I have proposed are not easy
to put in place. So it is reasonable to ask whether my general, abstract argument can be turned into concrete implementations. What difference to what
is understood is made by engaging in these service practices? I cannot
answer this in a general or in a conclusive way. By way of a partial (even
oblique) and far from conclusive answer, let me offer some reflections on
how an obligatory service component affected discussions in a class,
Methodologies of the Study of Poverty, I recently taught in the philosophy of
the social sciences (for details of the course, see Lacey 1995b). Most of the
students were involved in weekly tutorial activities in the community center
of a public housing development in an impoverished city (Chester,
Pennsylvania, which is very close to Swarthmore), accompanying which
were opportunities to talk with adults from the community, and occasional60
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ly for some of the students to attend community meetings. 4 The following is
a list of some of the ways in which directed reflection and discussion of the
service activity enhanced the philosophical discussion of the class. I do not
claim that these matters cannot be discussed fruitfully without the context
provided by the experiential contact, only that the contact lends a measure
of concreteness and urgency and thus generates motivation to delve deeper
into them.
1. It provided a rich context for the discussion of observation, particularly of how observation may or may not be a function of such factors as
what one is looking for, one's personal history, one's location, what one is
doing, how one is interacting with people, one's expectations, and one's cultural background. When students compared their own observations of the
community center and events happening in it with those of their fellow students, those of the community members, and those of the public housing
officials, they were struck by differences (on occasion, even contradictions),
and so the issue of the objectivity (or not) of observation in the social sciences became an immediate and concrete issue.
2. What is the phenomenon of poverty that social science aims to
understand and the public policymakers want to redress? Is poverty (and its
attendant phenomena, e.g., racism and abuse of women) just a problem? Is
it also a site for hope, struggle, and novel possibilities? How does one's characterization of poverty interact with one's social values and commitments
about programs to transform the condition of the poor? How is poverty
experienced by the poor, how is their experience relevant to how one characterizes poverty, and what sort of language do they use to describe it?
Engaged contact with the phenomenon seemed to attune the students to
the ways in which social science studies (and the public discussion about
welfare reform) tend to presuppose answers to such questions, and so raised
sharply the questions about evidence that are central to this article.
3. What is, and what ought to be, the relevance of local knowledge
(including of local history) to understanding the phenomenon of poverty, to
public policy formation, and to the decision-making processes of public
authorities? The students quickly became aware that the residents know a
great deal that they do not know, and would not come to know except
through organized contact with the residents, e.g., about (in our case)
Chester and its history, about the public housing development, about the
hopes, visions, and motivations of the residents as well as about their sufferings and frustrations, and about their struggle (and sometimes organized
efforts) to create a better life, especially for their children. This experience,
in turn, raises critical questions about the "privilege" that tends to be granted to knowledge gained in the social sciences. What (if anything) grounds
the privilege of "scientifically generated" knowledge? Does it properly dis-
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place local knowledge when we seek comprehensive understanding and the
grounding of the social values that shape public policy? How, for instance,
might local knowledge provide relevant evidence for testing assumptions
about "dependency" often appealed to in the current welfare reform debate 11
4. Questions about certain social science methodologies were sharpened. Concerning ethnographic studies, for instance, what are we to say of
the reliability of a study if its subjects disagree with it? This question is
sharpened when one can discuss with the subjects the reasons for their disagreement. The general adequacy of quantitative methods was raised, too,
especially when students heard articulate residents characterize the community's condition with emphasis on concepts such as "brokenness" rather
than measures such as low income or unemployment rate. "Brokenness" is
used by Ella Thompson 6 to characterize the core sufferings experienced by
and within a community- brokenness of personal lives, brokenness of relations among residents, brokenness from the life of the city and public affairs
- that must be "healed" if the cycle of despair and violence is to be overcome. And the students tended, for example, to move beyond the statistics
about how many children finish their schooling and began to ask about the
motivations and motivation-formation processes of those who do and those
who do not.
5. The students experienced the residents as agents, people with an
interest in developing themselves and transforming their community, whose
leaders have their own ideas about how to go about doing so (and a history
of attempts, with some successes and some failures, to implement their
ideas). They also observed the public housing authorities making a decision
to relocate residents without discussion with them and without taking into
consideration their forcefully articulated objections and alternative proposals. In short, the authorities ignored the residents' agency (knowledge,
understanding, values, and aspirations), thus acting on the basis of an
understanding of who the residents are that is not faithful to reality.' The
students also became aware that in the ongoing debate about welfare
reform, welfare recipients have in general not been invited to participate,
thus coming to perceive it as a debate that presupposes that it is appropriate to make far-reaching decisions about the lives of poor people without
engaging them in the process. This provided a context for asking how to
investigate a group while simultaneously recognizing the agency, proper to
human beings, of its members. Also, how could public policy be developed in
ways that respect the agency of poor people, rather than treating them as
objects for whose lives decisions are made in accordance with what
"experts" and "authorities" think is good for them? What sort of social
science do we pursue when we take these questions seriously? This raised
the potential salience of "participant action" research and the centrality of
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interpretive methods that attempt to understand actions, habits, motives,
and predispositions as springing from agents' self-understandings.
6. What is the range of possibilities afforded by current realities? Are
these possibilities fully framed by what can be done within prevailing socioeconomic structures in accordance with current dominant tendencies? The
students met residents who aspire to different, novel possibilities in which
the community would exercise control over itself and be an active agent in
public affairs (see Note 7). The aspirations are often expressed in a language
that involves interesting twists in the use of commonplace terms. Where
"empowerment," typically implying strong individualist connotations, is often
used to express the objective of welfare reform, community residents speak
instead of aspiring to "community empowerment." I have attempted to sum
up what is intended by community empowerment as follows:
It aims for the sharing of responsibilities and for community transformation, rather than encouraging individuals to "get out," just to cope, to live
with lowered expectancies, or to accept the dependency that can accompany welfare; it aims to motivate community members to participate actively and authoritatively in the process of community transformation so that
they have a genuine choice: to construct a fulfilling life in their own community, or to follow some other path. Community empowerment is thus
part of a process of social transformation that is grounded in democratic
means, and that at the same time enhances the expression of democracy. It
puts democracy ahead of efficiency, the considered judgment of community
leaders ahead of the generalizations and assessments of possibility of
social analysts, and community involvement ahead of programs designed
and implemented by outside experts. It builds the conditions for genuine
democratic decision making at the community level so that the community
members become active agents and decision makers in the process of
change, and do not become reduced to recipients of aid, the goals and programs of which are determined by outside agencies. It holds that the
authority for determining what is good for the community lies - in the
final analysis after appropriate dialogue with agencies that wish to offer
services and with due consideration given to the experiences of other communities - with the community members themselves. (Lacey, Bradley, and
Eldridge 1994: 45)

How (repeating the question posed above) does one deploy empirical
evidence to answer this question? There is virtually no philosophical literature that addresses this matter of evidence concerning claims about future
possibilities (Lacey 1995a), yet I believe that it is the most urgent epistemological matter facing us today. One of the major achievements of the course
was that the abstract question "Are there genuine alternative possibilities
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afforded by current realities?" became converted into the concrete one, "Do
the residents' alternative proposals represent genuine possibilities?" That
question is open to a measure of empirical investigation: by ongoing observation of
• the unfolding of the proposals,
• their being turned into a series of concrete projects for addressing
needs,
• their gradually bringing about recognizable changes in the community that the residents recognize as positive, and
• their becoming linked institutionally with the projects and structures
of other groups and institutions (including universities)
so that they begin to obtain the structural conditions for permanent maintenance and growth. ThJ last consideration here also turns attention to the
link between transformation of the condition of the poor and transforma tion of major societal institutions, including universities. One component of
service activities is that friendships may be established among community
and university personnel; such friendships can be the source of motivation
for institutional change. (For a more detailed discussion of the issue of evidence/future possibilities, see Lacey 1997.)
7. Contact with the phenomenon of poverty engenders a strong sense
both of complexity of problems and of tenuousness of opportunity, as well
as a realization of the presence ofresistance and struggle. To understand the
phenomenon, one must grasp the full causal nexus - the macro and micro
causal factors; the structural, interpersonal, and behavioral; matters of public policy and personal responsibility and initiative - and gaining such
understanding cannot properly ignore the input derived from the perspective of poor people themselves. 8 Transformation of the condition of the poor
requires both structural and personal transformation in dialectical interaction. There are no quick fixes; there is no one (principal) or one type of causal
factor that has only to be changed and transformation will be ensured.
Awareness of such complexity tends to move one away from using explanatory analysis as a means for assigning blame or moral responsibility.
Frequently, the public debate is more about who is to blame for the pathologies of poverty, and who is responsible for initiating and funding solutions,
than it is about understanding the phenomenon as it is and what could be
done to transform it. While I do not think that the social sciences can be
value free (Lacey 1997), I think it is a profound error to confuse explanatory
analysis with the assignment of blame, and to remove from the causal
account factors that one thinks ought not be changed (e.g., private control
of capital) because of considerations of rights. 9 Responsibility can be exercised in a variety of ways (depending on who one is and where one is located); when we look to the full causal nexus, it becomes possible to discern
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where one can make constructive interventions in order to exercise one's
own responsibility - and different people and institutions may be better
suited to make interventions in different places and ways.

Concluding Remarks
My conclusions are modest. In order to understand certain phenomena (e.g.,
urban poverty), I have maintained, one must draw upon appropriate contact
with the phenomena, and service activities may provide the vehicle for this
contact. The difficult part is to design the service activities and their place
within a curricular structure so that they do, in fact, contribute to the gaining of understanding. I offered a summary of the outcome of my effort to create such a design. I think that the outcome is promising, as are those of other
courses developed within the Chester-Swarthmore College Community
Coalition (Lacey, Bradley, and Eldridge 1994), and they will be replicated and
further developed. These outcomes become part of the empirical record testing whether service-learning (and which forms of it) really does enhance the
gaining of understanding. No general epistemological argument about service as a possible vehicle for entering into the appropriate contact with the
phenomenon can justify failure to scrutinize the empirical record of how service has functioned in learning projects. Sound epistemology does not guarantee sound pedagogy. Attention must also be paid to the limitations of any
effort to implement service-learning. In connection with my own course, it
became clear that a one-semester contact is not enough to gain a good grasp
of things. Short-term contact, even supplemented by a few interviews with
residents, is not enough. A longer-term interaction, with multiple phases and
multiple dimensions, involving participation in several courses or research
projects clearly would be conducive to nurturing greater interpretive abilities
and also be more consistent with the fourth level of collaboration listed
above. 10 Meanwhile, the approach that I have presented remains exploratory
and its conclusions provisional.
Despite these qualifications, it seems to me clear that if we can learn
how to "listen to the evidence" and to incorporate it into our efforts to understand the morally significant social phenomena of our day, we will be indeed
constructing a path that avoids the twin pitfalls of ideology and illusion. 11

Notes
1. Clearly, my argument is not limited in application to the case (urban poverty) I discuss, but I will leave the limits of its generalization as an open question. I emphasize,
however, that my argument does not provide support for the value of much of what
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has been included under the label of "service-learning." It remains open that other
arguments may support other forms of service-learning, e.g., internships that contribute to professional formation, although severe criticism of many forms of servicelearning is implicit in my argument (see also Note 10). Furthermore, that the service
activities are of value in themselves or that in the course of them certain moral
virtues (e.g., compassion, charity, justice) may be cultivated has little to do with the
merits of their inclusion in the university curriculum (but see Note 8) - as distinct
from their inclusion in a university's social outreach programs. My argument supports
a place for certain forms of service-learning in the curriculum on the basis of their
(potential) contribution to gaining understanding. It is not meant to be an argument
that any form of service-learning become required of all students.
2. This sentence expresses simultaneously both a value judgment and a judgment
about the requirements of adequate understanding. Denial of it also involves both
kinds of judgments. Some may say that gaining understanding of urban poverty
involves only predicting or anticipating its likely trajectories, perhaps under the conditions of welfare reform. But this involves the value judgment that identifying "lost
possibilities" is not part of gaining understanding, and that there is no obligation to
attempt to gain understanding that might usefully inform projects whose likelihood
of reaching a successful outcome is (under current conditions) low.
3. Any judgment about future possibilities inevitably involves subtle mixtures of prediction and promise, anticipation and intention, awareness of current realities and
desire for novelty. Keeping the proper balances is necessary for gaining sound understanding. Such judgments always remain conjectural. But the degree of confidence
one accords to them can change with changed motivations of human agents.
4. The activities were part of a set of programs, developed by the Chester-Swarthmore
College Community Coalition (CSCCC), attempting to implement the four conditions
stated in the text. These conditions have not yet been put in place as fully as I, and
my collaborators both from the community and from Swarthmore College, consider
desirable. For some details about CSCCC, its history, philosophy, and programs, see
Lacey, Bradley, and Eldridge (1994). The CSCCC idea came from the model developed
at the Central American University in El Salvador, and articulated in the writings of I.
Ellacuria and I. Martin-Baro, the most important of which are published in Hassett
and Lacey (1991b). I have discussed it further in Hassett and Lacey (1991a) and Lacey
(1993, 1995a). Ellacuria and Martin-Baro did not discuss service-learning as such.
Their concern was to integrate the "social outreach" programs of their university systematically with its teaching and research programs.
5. This also raises the question of the possible teaching role in the university of the
bearers of local knowledge, an important question in the light of the fourth level of
collaboration indicated above (see Lacey, Bradley, and Eldridge 1994).
6. Ella Thompson is president of the Resident Council, William Penn Homes, in
Chester, and cochair of the board of CSCCC. She is a long-term resident of public
housing and community organizer. "Brokenness" is just one term where students
found descriptive language (with rich "theoretical" content) used by articulate members of the community that is not a commonplace in social science and public policy
discussions. The adequacy of "translations" of community analytic and explanatory
idiom becomes an important question in these contexts, e.g., in connection with my
attempt to summarize the content of "community empowerment."
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7. Shortly after the completion of the course, as a consequence of concerted pressure
from the residents, the authorities dropped their plans and agreed to reconstruct the
housing development with a design that the residents worked out in collaboration
with an architect appointed by the authorities. Efficacy of action and practicality of
(some of) their ideas are further "data" that the contact, acquired through service,
would bring to the students' attention, and they also would furnish partial concrete
content to what projects that further community empowerment could be like.
8. In Note 1, I maintained that the justification of a pedagogical form depends principally upon epistemic considerations, and that that is not sufficient to appeal to moral
virtues that may be cultivated by it. This is consistent with certain practices for gaining understanding being dialectically intertwined with the cultivation of certain
moral virtues (Lacey 1993). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine participation in the kind
of service-learning that I have advocated if one does not aspire to manifest particular
moral values in one's life, or if one is not prepared to have one's imagination stirred
with a view to entertaining critical confrontations with the predominant social structures and perhaps lifetime commitments to social transformation, working with community leaders toward building new institutions. This kind of service-learning, thus,
seems to require and imply conscientiza(do (Freire 1970), or the development of"morally critical awareness" (Martin-Baro 1991). I asked, What kind of contact with the phenomenon must we have - what must we do - in order to gain the relevant evidence? It may well be that, in order to do what must be done, one must be of a certain type of character or hold certain values. If so, service-learning will be involved
with the cultivation of moral virtues, but its place in the curriculum derives from its
contribution to gaining understanding.
9. It is also an error to predict disastrous consequences simply from what one judges
to be (morally) ill-motivated policies. The possibilities afforded by the moment are
always more encompassing than what can be grasped by a priori or moralistic
analysis. It may well be that the new realities created by the implementation of illmotivated policies will become the occasion for a new level of motivation and energy
among community members to develop their own programs of community empowerment. The matter is an empirical one, and one about which we can draw little insight
from past regularities. Since there is so much new to be understood following the
passage of welfare reform, this is a fitting time to be engaging in the kind of servicelearning that I am advocating. It is worth noting that one very important form of service at this moment is bringing to the community knowledge about such things as
legislation, regulations, new agencies, rights and legal protections, and opportunities
that may have been opened up by the new policies.
10. Numerous objections, not always mutually consistent, have been made to the idea
of requiring service in courses for academic credit: that it involves treating poor communities as laboratories; that it politicizes the curriculum; that it lowers standards;
that it permits the curriculum to be shaped by subjective preferences and specialinterest moral agendas; that it clashes with the "nonpartisan" character of an educational institution and may even threaten its autonomy; that it reinforces those who
would put educational experiences rather than disciplinary inquiry at the center of
the curriculum; and that it downplays that the distinctive role of the university is to
gain knowledge rather than to be a direct agent of social change. I believe that these
objections need to be taken seriously and responded to. Some of them may constitute
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valid objections to some instances and conceptions of service-learning. I cannot, however, address these matters here.
11. This article includes extracts from "Methodologies of the Study of Poverty" (Lacey
1995b), which are used with permission of Pennsylvania Campus Compact.
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